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Near the end of the prologue of Plato’s Republic, Socrates says to his opponent
Thrasymachus  that what  they  are  discussing  is  “no  ordinary/insignificant
matter, but how we ought to live” (1.352d). As in many of Plato’s writings,
Socrates here played the role of his mouthpiece: “How we ought to live” was
indeed no insignificant  matter  for  Plato,  but  the starting point  and ultimate
purpose of his philosophical investigations.
Relegating the  pre-Socratic  philosophers  to  the  discipline’s  prehistory,  it  is
sometimes suggested that Western philosophy started with Plato. Alfred North
Whitehead even claimed that the history of Western philosophy “consists of a
series  of  footnotes  to  Plato”  (1929:  39).  This  is  probably  a  slight
overstatement, but it is certainly true that Plato played a central role — perhaps
even  the central  role — in  the  birth  of  Western  philosophy.  And  as  Plato’s
philosophy was born from a relatively practical and ordinary problem (i.e. how
we ought to live), in extension, so was Western philosophy.
There is something obviously wrong with this story,  however. (But there is
something right about it as well.) Excluding the pre-Socratics from the history
of philosophy does not seem to sketch a fair picture of the discipline’s origin,
but  even  more  problematic  is  that  Plato’s  most  famous  student,  Aristotle,
doesn’t fit well in this picture either.  In the introduction of what came to be
known as his  Metaphysics, Aristotle wrote that it  is because of wonder that
men first  began to  philosophize,  and  the  kind of  wonders  he mentions are
wonders about the natural world surrounding us (982b12ff). Aristotle’s concern
was the same as that of most of the pre-Socratics: figuring out how things
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work and explaining reality. It  is  for  that  reason that  Aristotle  wrote about
physics and geography as well as ethics, for example, and about many other
topics that we wouldn’t classify as philosophy today.
It seems important to me, however, that much of what grew out of the pre-
Socratic/Aristotelian concern has since branched off into various disciplines of
science,  leaving only a  small  core  of  questions unanswerable  by empirical
means, while Plato’s concern is still fully the domain of philosophy. Perhaps, it
is  fair  to  say  that  science/philosophy  originated  with  the  pre-Socratic/
Aristotelian concern and ethics/philosophy with Plato’s,  and that throughout
the following millennia proto- and sub-disciplines continuously changed their
affiliations and configurations.
The origin and original purpose of philosophy is critical reflection on relatively
ordinary  human  concerns.  This  seems  equally  true  of  the  pre-Socratic/
Aristotelian  concern  as  of  Plato’s.  Note  that  I  omitted  the  qualification
“Western” here, because Chinese and Indian philosophy are not significantly
different  in  this  respect,  although  the  historical  core  concerns  differ.  For
Chinese  philosophy  that  core  concern  was  social-philosophical  as  well  as
moral: What is the right set of social conventions (dao 道; literally “way”) to
enable and guide people’s virtue (de 德 )? And the historical core concern of
Indian philosophy was soteriological: How to achieve liberation (mokṣa) from
the cycle of death and rebirth (saṃsāra) and related suffering.1
In all three major philosophical traditions (i.e. Greek, Indian, Chinese) debates
about  these  core concerns  led to  more fundamental  questions:  to  questions
about  the  meaning  of  key  terms  in  the  debate  and  about  the  origin  of
meaning(s), to questions about the nature and origins of knowledge, about the
1 The  pre-Socratic/Aristotelian concern was also a concern in  India and China. In Buddhist
philosophy, for example, understanding reality — that is, the world of saṃsāra — is necessary
for escaping it (and this thus more or less follows from the above-mentioned core concern). In
China, the two concerns seem to have been separate more, although it is not difficult to find
exceptions. Wang Chong 王充 (see below) may be a good example.
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nature of reality, and so forth.2 Where and when philosophy found fertile soil
and  philosophical  debate wasn’t  suppressed by crippling orthodoxies,  these
“more  fundamental”  questions  developed  into  philosophy  of  language,
epistemology, metaphysics, and so forth, but these were not yet separate fields.
(And  many  fields  split  off  from  philosophy  when  their  research  methods
became empirical more than purely logical and/or speculative.) However, with
increasing  specialization,  the  distance  to  (at  least  some  of)  the  original
questions gradually increased, leading ultimately to a near complete separation
in 20th century academic philosophy. Some of Aristotle’s curiosity about how
things  work  remains,  but  the  connection  between  esoteric  discussions  in
metaphysics, for example, and how to live — and there  are such connections,
even if they are indirect — has been lost in the mist of time. (These “esoteric
discussions”, by the way, are immensely fascinating, which explains why it is
so easy to get lost in them.)
Specialization is an unavoidable consequence of the growth of knowledge. A
few centuries ago it was still possible to be reasonably well-acquainted with
most fields of scientific inquiry, but nowadays a physicist, for example, cannot
even be expected  to  have  more  than superficial  knowledge of  the  parts  of
physics that lie beyond her own narrow area of specialization, and the same is
true  in  philosophy.3 The  consequence  thereof,  however,  is  that  much  of
contemporary academic philosophy has (almost?) completely lost sight of the
much  more  ordinary  questions  and  concerns  that  once  gave  birth  to  the
discipline. Reinforcing this trend, the kind of broad and integrative philosophy
that connects the various branches in an attempt to systematically answer those
2 There is another similarity between the three traditions: their quests for absolute certainty (i.e.
the unchanging  dao,  ultimate truth,  etc.)  and its counterpart,  the critical realization of the
certain failure of that quest (in Skepticism, Daoism, and Madhyamaka, etc.) (therein finding
certainty, after all).
3 Specialization has been further promoted by the need for young scientists and philosophers to
find a manageable and clearly delimited topic that they can master quickly enough to publish a
few papers.
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questions has been discredited in some schools of philosophy, and went out of
fashion in others.
The result of these developments is a near complete separation of academic
philosophy from the relatively ordinary human concerns at its roots, which has
made philosophy increasingly irrelevant  outside the narrow confines  of  the
academy.4 One may even wonder what justifies philosophy if it can no longer
fulfill its original purposes. That is a rather reactionary sentiment, however,
based on the idea that philosophy — or any discipline for that matter — is not
allowed to change its  purpose and fundamental  concerns.  Perhaps,  Richard
Rorty (1979) is right in claiming that
“ philosophy” is not a name for a discipline which confronts permanent issues,
and  unfortunately  keeps  misstating  them,  or  attacking  them  with  clumsy
dialectical instruments. Rather, it is a cultural genre, a “voice in the conversation
of mankind” (…), which centers on one topic rather than another at some given
time not  by dialectical  necessity  but  as  a  result  of  various  things  happening
elsewhere in the conversation (...) or of individual men of genius who think of
something new (...), or perhaps of the resultant of several such forces. (p. 264)
Perhaps, being a “cultural genre” could be all the justification that academic
philosophy needs, if it would be one. But it isn’t. Even if Western philosophy
was  one cultural  genre  in  the  past,  it  now consists  of  two major  schools,
analytic  and continental  philosophy,  that  hardly communicate with,  or  even
understand each other, supplemented with a number of smaller schools such as
Marxist, pragmatist, feminist, and Africana philosophy. In addition to these,
there  are  the  various  schools  and  traditions  of  non-Western  philosophy:
Buddhist  philosophy,  African  philosophy,  Confucianism,  Mohism,  Daoism,
and so forth. Philosophy is not a “voice in the conversation of mankind”, but a
4 In case of analytic philosophy social irrelevance was more or less enforced during the Cold
War  (see  Reisch  2005).  It  never  recovered.  Continental  philosophy  on  the  other  hand
undermined its own relevance through anti-realism (see footnote 14) and intractability.
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cacophony of  voices.  And new voices  keep being added through academic
hyper-specialization, splitting up schools into topical units with as little mutual
communication and understanding as the schools themselves.
What  binds  these  various  schools  and  specializations  together  is  the
“philosophy”  label  and  the  “big”  questions  in  their  past:  questions  of  life,
death,  truth,  and suffering,  questions that  once  gave  rise to  the three  main
philosophical traditions. It is these questions and the history of thought about
them that could make philosophy a cultural genre (and that used to make it a
cultural genre), but specialization slowly undermines all shared knowledge and
all  common ground,  leaving  nothing but  small,  relatively isolated,  esoteric
sects that have nothing in common but a mostly forgotten history.5
To become a  “voice  in  the  conversation  of  mankind”  (again),  the  various
voices  within philosophy would first have to start listening to each other, but
even  then,  becoming a  “cultural  genre”  or  a  “voice  in  the  conversation  of
mankind” may be insufficient for some of us (or its sufficiency may depend on
what that voice is contributing to the conversation). It certainly is not why I
think that philosophy matters, or should matter, or why philosophy matters to
me.  Surely,  “I’m  trying  to  contribute  to  a  voice  in  the  conversation  of
mankind” isn’t the kind of answer I would want to give to my daughter when
she  is  old  enough  to  ask  me  (and  understand  the  answer)  why  I  study
philosophy, or to my students, or to others whose opinions I care about. The
questions and concerns that gave birth to philosophy are questions that matter,
not just to philosophers, but to anyone. They are simultaneously very big and
very ordinary questions. In the attempt to answer them, philosophers cut them
up in very many smaller (and less ordinary) questions, and somehow lost sight
of the big (and ordinary) questions in the process, but it is the big questions
that matter outside the academy. It is the big questions that matter to me.
5 Most (but not all) of the points in the last two pages were made before by Samuel Wheeler in
an unpublished paper titled “Specialization and the Future of Analytic Philosophy”. Wheeler
especially emphasizes the detrimental effects of the problem mentioned in footnote 3.
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Specialization and the consequent fragmentation created two problems: one for
philosophy as  an  (academic)  discipline  (or  cultural  genre)  by undermining
what binds it together into a (single) discipline (or cultural genre), and one for
those  among  us  whose  philosophical  temperament  pushes  us  towards  the
unfashionable,  big questions that  once gave birth to the discipline,  but  that
clash with the esoteric concerns of (most of) academic philosophy. These two
problems  have  a  common  solution:  anarchism.  Not  anarchism  in  the
traditional,  political  sense,  but  anarchism  as  philosophical  approach  or
methodology, as metaphilosophy. Obviously, this “answer” is an answer only
if it is reasonably clear what it means for a method to be “anarchist”. It isn’t.
Or not yet at least, but I hope it will be after a few more pages.
The  notion  of  an  anarchist  method  is  generally  associated  with  Paul
Feyerabend’s  argument  in  Against  Method (1975) against  (strict)
methodological rules on the grounds that a lack of rigid rules best serves the
progress of science, and has done so in the past. Feyerabend labeled this lack
of  methodological  rules  “anarchism” (usually preceded with a  qualification
like  “epistemological”  or  “methodological”),  but  the  labeling  followed  the
theory: he did not set out to devise some kind of anarchist methodology,  and
whether his proposed method really is anarchist (rather than merely sharing a
superficial similarity with a popular conception of anarchism) is debatable.
More recently, Jeff Ferrel and others6 have argued that the anarchist method is
fieldwork  or  participatory  observation  based  on  Max  Weber’s  notion  of
Verstehen. Aside from the fact that participatory observation is of limited use
in philosophy, there are reasons to doubt the appropriateness of the “anarchist”
qualification in this case as well. What is anarchist about the proposed method
is that it is the method that best matches the anarchist scientist’s pre-existing
social and political engagement. It is not anarchist in the sense that it is based
on an analysis of what anarchism is and how that translates to methodology.
6 See  Ferrel  (2009)  and most  of  the  other  papers  in  the  section  “Methodologies”  in  the
anthology Contemporary Anarchist Studies (Amster et al. 2009).
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Hence,  it  is  a  method an  anarchist  should  use more  than a method that  is
anarchist  itself.  Similarly,  Peter  Kropotkin  wrote  his  Modern  Science  and
Anarchism (1908) to answer the question “what method [anarchism] employs
in its researches” (p. 11); that is, what method an anarchist should  use. His
answer,  however,  is  diametrically  opposed  to  Ferrel’s.  Instead  of  the  anti-
positivism  of  Verstehen-based  fieldwork  or  participatory  observation,
Kropotkin argues for the positivism embodied in the common methods of the
natural sciences: “Anarchism does not recognize any method other than the
natural-scientific” (p. 92; “natural-scientific-inductive” on p. 91).
Contrary to Ferrel and Kropotkin, I am not suggesting a method that anarchists
should use here, not a method-for-anarchists, but an anarchist method, and I
haven’t said anything yet  about what makes a method anarchist. Answering
that question, of course, depends at least in part on the meaning of the two
constituting concepts “anarchist” (or -ism) and “method”. I’ll assume the latter
concept to be unproblematic: a scientific method is a set of rules for choosing
between alternative theories, explanations, hypotheses, tests, procedures, and
so forth within the context of scientific practice. Such a set can in principle be
empty,  as  in  Feyerabend’s  proposal.7 “Anarchism”,  on  the  other  hand,  is
considerably more ambiguous. There is no universally accepted definition of
“anarchism”,  but  perhaps  the  term  itself  can  be  used  as  a  guide.  In  his
contribution  to  the  11th  edition  of  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica,  Peter
Kropotkin  (1910) translated  (but  not  defined)  “anarchism”  as  “contrary  to
authority” (p. 914). A longer translation could be that an-arch-ism opposes or
rejects  (ἀν-)  (coercive)  power/authority  (ἀρχή)  and  the  institutionalization
thereof in the form of some power-wielder (ἀρχός). The term does not imply a
7 Or perhaps in a caricature thereof if it is assumed that Feyerabend’s rejection of rules is not as
radical and complete as it may seem to be. It should be noted that Feyerabend suggests that
the empty set is not a method, as his title, Against Method, indicates. I will, however, ignore
that suggestion to avoid having to introduce a term that comprises both ruled methods and
Feyerabendian rule-less-ness.
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rejection  of  rules  (νόμος  or  θεσμός);8 that  would  be  “anomism”  or
“athesmism”.  Hence,  if  the  term  does  not  misguide  us,  anarchism  is  not
necessarily opposed to (all) rules, which would imply that “anarchism” is a
misnomer for Feyerabend’s position.
In the final  chapter  of his book  Der Anarchismus (1900),  comparing seven
famous  anarchists  from  the  19th  and  late  18th  century,  Paul Eltzbacher
concluded that they had nothing in common, except “that they deny the state
for our future” (p. 249). As a definition of anarchism, rejection of the state is
too narrow, however: it only applies to political anarchism, and it makes little
sense to say that an anarchist method for philosophy (or science) is based on a
rejection  of  the  state.  What  different  kinds  of  anarchism — methodological,
political, and so forth — have in common (and what makes them anarchist)  is
not  a  rejection  of  the  state,  but — as  the  above  brief  analysis  of  the  term
“anarchism” suggests — a rejection of what the state embodies in the political
sphere: power, authority, coercion.  Unfortunately, this doesn’t make it much
clearer what exactly anarchism is, as the notions of power and authority are
notoriously ambiguous, perhaps even essentially contested (Gallie 1956, Lukes
1974).9 (Even the concept of the “state” is not entirely unambiguous, by the
way,10 but that is of no concern here.)
8 There  is  no  single  unambiguous  translation  equivalent  of  the  modern  concept  of
(methodological) rule in ancient Greek, but closest seem “νόμος”, meaning a.o. custom, law,
ordinance  made by  authority;  and/or  the  much more  uncommon “θεσμός”,  meaning  that
which is laid down, law, rule, precept, rite, institution, etc.
9 The contestation of “essentially contested concepts” is essential to the debates they are used
in. Each party in the debate claims that their definition is correct, and by implication, there are
no neutral definitions. Rather, any definition of an essentially contested concept is normative
(and political) because it captures the interpretation of only one party in the debate. The notion
was introduced in Gallie (1956).
10 There has been a considerable change in meaning of the concept of the “state” throughout the
last few centuries (at least). See, for example, Boldt (1990). By implication, the rejection of
the state may have meant (subtly, but significantly) different things for different anarchists,




Authority  and  power  are  often  contrasted  in  terms  of  rights  and  abilities:
authority is a right to get some desired effect, while power is an ability to get
it,  regardless of opposition. As a right,  authority depends on acceptance (or
recognition, acknowledgment, consent,  etc.) of that right: authority is  created
by acceptance (and thus existentially dependent thereon). Power, on the other
hand, is objective fact. Power may seem to be dependent on compliance (or
obedience), but compliance does not create power. Rather, power conceptually
implies compliance, and the other way around; they are different sides of the
same coin. Acceptance and compliance stand in different relations to authority
and power, respectively, but also point at a further difference: authority is a
right to have something accepted; power is an ability to have something done.
To  have  power  over  someone  means  to  be  able  to  make  that  person  do
something. (Where “doing” is understood broadly, and thus includes saying,
giving,  and so forth.)  To have authority over someone means having one’s
judgment that something is true, right, or desirable accepted. (Note that this
includes the judgment that some action by the authority holder is right.) Power
can be coercive,  but one cannot be coerced to think something, only to do
something;  not  to  accept  some  claim,  but  only to  say or  pretend  that  one
accepts it. By implication, authority cannot be coercive.
Power  and  authority  overlap,  both  conceptually  and  phenomenally.  For
example, Aghion and Tirole (1997) distinguish formal authority as “the right to
decide” from real authority as “the effective control over decisions” (p. 1), but
such real authority — as effective control — seems power more than authority.
French and Raven’s (1959) influentially distinguished six kinds of power. Of
these six,  referent  power, which is based on the charisma and interpersonal
skills  of  the  power  holder,  and  expert  power,  which  is  based  on  skills  or
expertise, seem kinds of authority more than power. Authority and power also
overlap in Antonio Gramsci’s notion of cultural hegemony and Steven Lukes’s
(1974)  ideological  power,  in  which  power/authority  works  by  influencing
values, preferences, thoughts, and ideas.
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The  notion  of  expert  power/authority  suggests  that  power/authority  is  not
always objectionable. At least, there doesn’t seem to be anything inherently
wrong in relying on the expert  judgment  of  someone who has  much more
knowledge in some relevant field. For example, if I want to know something
about particle physics, I will rely on expert authority. I will  have to rely on
expert authority, as I don’t want to study physics and (cannot) do the necessary
experiments myself. However, if power/authority is not always and necessarily
objectionable, then when is it? Richard Sylvan’s (1993) answer to that question
is  opacity. Expert authority is transparent. If I’d want to, I can study physics
and check all the experimental data myself (and even do some experiments
myself). In case of opaque power/authority, on the other hand, it is impossible
to similarly “see through” the authority. Transparency means that I can check
the reasoning all the way down to observations and fundamental assumptions.
Opacity means that whatever lays behind the opaque authority’s decree is out
of my reach and thus effectively irrelevant to me. Transparent authority is open
to verification and revision; opaque authority is closed, dogmatic.
Anarchism then, opposes opaque power/authority. (Note that coercion is a kind
of opacity as whatever reasons lie beyond the coercion are out of reach for the
person  being  coerced.)  And  if  this  is  right,  then  an  anarchist  method is  a
method that avoids opaque power/authority and demands transparency. That
doesn’t  sound very revolutionary.  Rather,  it  seems to  be  part  of  what  any
widely  accepted  scientific  method  promotes.  Perhaps  then,  Kropotkin  was
right when he wrote that the anarchist method is the method of the natural
sciences. Science, however, is not nearly as transparent as it is supposed to be,
and philosophy probably even less.
The most  common opaque power  structures  in  science  and  philosophy are
conventions:  paradigms  or  examples  of  “good”  science,  disciplinary
boundaries and divisions between schools and traditions, ingrained ways of
doing things, and so forth. Anarchism as method does not necessarily imply
their rejection, however, but rejects their opacity. Paradigms, boundaries, rules,
148
Anarchism as Metaphilosophy
and so forth must be transparent (like anything else). That is, they must be
justified  by  transparent  arguments  and  they  must  be  open  to  inspection,
revision,  or  rejection.  Many  conventions  in  science  and  philosophy  are
perfectly justifiable and many are perfectly transparent. This includes many
methodological principles, but also the procedure of peer review, for example.
Those, therefore, are perfectly acceptable. But there are also many conventions
that  are  mere conventions and that  lack sufficient  justification. Disciplinary
boundaries  are  an  example  thereof.  Disciplinary  boundaries  are  useful  to
organize libraries and universities, but reality isn’t inherently separated into
sociological and economic spheres, or physical and biological ones. Of course,
almost everyone knows this, but in practice the boundaries between disciplines
(and schools) are very hard.
Transparency means and requires that an argument, a line of reasoning, can be
easily seen through, can be easily checked and confirmed, rejected, or revised.
Transparency, therefore, requires that arguments are well-structured, explicit,
and logical, and that all its premises and assumptions are open to inspection.
Intuition, or gut-feeling, therefore, can never be an acceptable ground for a
premise. And secondly, transparency means avoiding ambiguity and rhetorical
trickery. Not all philosophy satisfies these simple requirements.
On  a  side  note,  much  of  the  above  considerations  do  not  just  apply  to
anarchism as method, but to anarchism simpliciter. Anarchism — in my opinion 
— only  rejects  opaque power/authority  and  because  reason  is  always  and
necessarily transparent and no unreasonable argument, decision, or action is
transparent, we can summarize the above in a new slogan for anarchism: “no
authority  but  reason”.  This,  of  course,  conflicts  with  popular  views  of
anarchism (or a caricature thereof) as rejecting all limits to individual freedom,
but that is the freedom of the rapist, the tyranny of whim. Even if the abolition
of limits to my freedom to do what I want when I want it would set me free, it
would enslave others, make them subject to my whim, to my opaque power,
but the tyranny of whim does not just enslave others, but myself as well, as
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Spinoza (1674) pointed out in a letter to an anonymous critic:
This is that human freedom, which all boast that they possess, and which consists
solely in the fact, that men are conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of
the causes whereby that desire has been determined. Thus an infant believes that
it desires milk freely; an angry child thinks he wishes freely for vengeance, a
timid child thinks he wishes freely to run away. Again a drunken man thinks, that
from the free  decision of his  mind he speaks words,  which afterwards,  when
sober, he would like to have left unsaid. So the delirious, the garrulous and others
of the same sort think that they act from the free decision of their mind, not that
they are carried away by impulse. As this misconception is innate in all men, it is
not easily conquered. (pp. 390-1)
The kind of transparency in argument that methodological anarchism requires
is  often  associated  with  analytic  philosophy  or  with  (modern)  Western
philosophy in general, but this is Western presumptuousness, of course, and it
can be found in other traditions and periods as well. A particularly interesting
example  is  the  first  century  Chinese  philosopher  Wang  Chong  王 充 :  an
outsider  and  relatively  poor,  mostly  autodidact  but  with  an  encyclopedic
knowledge, and driven by a strong aversion to fashionable nonsense and the
“flowery and artificial writing” (華偽之文) that he perceived to be customary
in his day. In contrast to the latter, his book Lunheng 論衡 , was intended to
promote truth and dispel  falsehoods by means of a two-faced philosophical
method of questioning (wen 問) what is unclear and challenging (nan 難) what
is false or invalid.11 The latter he generally did by means of clear, unadorned,
and  direct  arguments,  often  in  modus  tollens.12 Wang  Chong  particularly
11 On Wang Chong’s philosophical method, see McLeod (2007).
12 Wang Chong’s use of modus tollens is not remarkable in itself — rather, it was a very common
argument form in ancient China (Harbsmeier 1998) — but his application stands out for its
transparency and explicitness. For a nice example of Wang Chong’s style of reasoning, see his
arguments against the belief in ghosts in the chapter Lunsi 論死.
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disliked flowery writing for its beguiling effect. The “common people” are all
too easily bewitched by exciting ideas in an attractive package:
世俗之性，好奇怪之語，說虛妄之文。何則？實事不能快意，而華虛驚
耳動心也。 It is the nature of common people to enjoy strange sayings and
uphold false  and absurd writings.  Why is this?  [Because] the truth cannot be
grasped quickly/easily, while flowery falsehoods astound the hearers and move
their minds. (Duizuo 對作 §2 — my translation)
And consequently:
起眾書並失實，虛妄之言勝真美也。 In the writings of the people all truth is
lost, and false and absurd doctrines subvert what is real and virtuous/beautiful. (id.)
There is an obvious anti-populist or even elitist sentiment in these claims, but
Wang Chong has a point that “flowery and artificial writing” has an advantage
in the marketplace of ideas. The relative obscurity of Wang Chong may even
confirm this point: he responded to the proliferation of “empty falsehoods”
(虛 ) with relatively dry and unexciting arguments,  which probably did not
contribute  much  to  his  popularity.  Nevertheless,  it  is  an  example  worth
following. Excitement is not a proxy for truth. In the contrary, the more exotic
and exciting an idea, the more likely it is false. A metaphilosophical anarchist
prefers sobriety to flowery falsehoods. Anarchism is boring.
Language does not just beguile us through “flowery and artificial writing”, but
also through a naive but  common belief  in  its  (political  and metaphysical)
neutrality and objectivity. According to Nietzsche,
in language, man posited an own world next to the other [world], a place that
man held to be so solid to, from it, lift the other world from its hinges and make
himself its lord. In so far as man throughout long periods of time believed in the
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concepts and names of things as  eternal truths,  did he develop the pride with
which he lifted himself above the animals: he really thought to have knowledge
of the world in language. (1878: §I.11 — my translation)
One  of  the  key  differences  between  the  two  main  schools  of  Western
philosophy, continental and analytic philosophy, is the linguistic beguilement
they  are  most  susceptible  to.  At  its  worst,  continental  philosophy  is  an
elaborate attempt to beat the reader into submission (to “astound the hearers
and move their minds”) with a barrage of metaphors, deepisms, intentional (?)
ambiguities  and  equivocations,  and  under-cooked  pseudo-arguments  that
sound right on a superficial  reading, but that  are impossible to spell  out in
detail, but even at its best, the claims of continental philosophers tends to be
obscured by “flowery and artificial writing”.13,14 Much of analytic philosophy,
on  the  other  hand,  falls  prey  to  the  second  beguilement,  put  down
unsurpassably by Nietzsche in the above quote, and fails to take (sufficiently)
seriously Ludwig Wittgenstein’s assertion that “philosophical problems arise
13 In  Brons  (2013),  I  argued  that  there  may  be  a  good,  philosophical  excuse  for  apparent
obscurity  in  continental  philosophy  in  some  cases  (Derrida’s  theory  of  différance,
specifically), but that excuse does not apply universally.
14 There is a second reason to be cautious about continental philosophy: its widespread anti-
realism.  The anti-realist  rejection of  an external/independent  reality  implies  a rejection of
objectivity,  but  without  objectivity,  there  are  no  objective  grounds  for  critique.  Without
objectivity (or objective truth), claims cannot be judged by the extent to which they represent
the way things are, but only by the interests they serve and by their rhetorical success. “Truth”
then, effectively becomes a euphemism for rhetorical success. Without objectivity, a liar is not
misrepresenting reality (because there is  no such thing as representing reality)  but just an
unsuccessful rhetor: lying is failing to convince. Conversely, telling the truth is succeeding;
truth is rhetorical success;  truth is power. Hence, rejecting objectivity and (some form of)
realism is opening the door to tyranny in its most opaque form. Of course, this argument does
not establish the truth of realism — it merely makes its opposite unacceptable to an anarchist 
— but there are independent grounds to assume that there must be an external/independent
reality: without it, language and communication would be impossible (e.g. Brons 2012, 2013).
Nevertheless,  the  rejection  of  anti-realism  should  not  be  taken  to  be  an  argument  for
acceptance of the naive forms of  realism common in analytic  philosophy.  There are other
alternatives (or intermediates), but that is a topic for another paper.
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when language goes on holiday” (1953:  §38). Philosophical  problems don’t
exist without us: we create them, and we create them through language. Much
earlier, Wittgenstein wrote that “the limits of my language mean the limits of
my world” (1921: §5.6). But that doesn’t mean that the limits of my language
are  the  limits  of  the world,  just  that  they are  the  limits  of  my experience
thereof,  of the world of my experience. We create philosophical problems by
assuming that the limits of my or our language are the limits of the world.
There is a saying in the Quran that
a good word is like a good tree whose root is firm, and whose branches are in the
sky; it gives its fruit at every season by the permission of its Lord. (…) And the
likeness of a bad word is as a bad tree, which is felled from above the earth, and
has no staying place. (14:24-26)
The  “bad  words”  are  the  source  of  philosophical  problems,  the  cases  of
“language going on holiday” (Wittgenstein), and the subject of Wang Chong’s
“questioning”  (wen 問 );  that  is,  critical  analysis  and  clarification  or
reconceptualization. And obviously, such “questioning” cannot be successful if
it  reduces  one  “bad  word”  to  another.  In  “Ontological  relativity”  (1968),
W.V.O. Quine pointed out that “a question of the form ‘What is an F?’ can be
answered only by recourse to a further term: ‘An F is a G’. The answer makes
only relative sense: sense relative to an uncritical acceptance of ‘G’” (p. 204).
This  is as  fundamental a principle of transparency as it is obvious:  reductive
explanation must improve intelligibility, not deteriorate it.
In addition to be being boring and cautious of language, a metaphilosophical
anarchist is also homeless (or at home everywhere, but that is really the same).
To  make  one’s  home in  a  school  of  philosophy is  to  (implicitly  and  sub-
consciously) submit to its conventions, however opaque those are; and not just
to submit to them, but to accept and internalize them. Schools are orthodoxies,
and as Nathan Salmon aptly remarked, “orthodoxy is supported less by reason
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than by inertia” (2005:  xvii).  Membership of  a  school  is  (sub-consciously)
allowing orthodoxy and convention to trump transparency and reason. For a
metaphilosophical anarchist the priority is always the other way around, and
for that reason, she cannot make a permanent home in any school. She can be a
visitor, however (although she might not be a very welcome one if she all too
explicitly questions the school’s conventions).
To avoid misunderstanding it is worth emphasizing that schools in the sense
intended here are not institutes, and that metaphilosophical anarchism neither
entails nor follows from “institutional anarchism”. Institutes, like any social
object, are  constituted by conventions (e.g. Searle 1995), and most of those
conventions  are  harmless  from  a  (meta-)  philosophical  point  of  view.
Consequently,  a  blanket  rejection  of  the  conventions  and  other  power
structures of institutes is ill-advised (and silly, actually) for three reasons: they
are unavoidable, they are (or should be!) mostly harmless (in the sense that
they do not necessarily affect the content of her research), and rejecting them
would almost certainly lead to unemployment.
Homelessness  comes  with  advantages  and  disadvantages.  A  homeless
philosopher is free to take what she needs from one school before moving on
to another. (Provided, of course, that the result is not some kind of incoherent
eclecticism.) More importantly,  only a homeless/anarchist philosopher is free
to follow a research interest that does not fit, or cannot satisfactorily fit, in any
school.  And  consequently,  only a  homeless/anarchist  philosopher  is  free  to
focus her attention on the big and ordinary questions that matter outside the
academy,  but  that  are  considered  too  broad,  too  ordinary,  too  vague,  too
ambitious, too practical, too systematic, too controversial, too whatever, on the
inside. Furthermore,  only a homeless/anarchist philosopher is free to pursue
these interests with a focus undistracted by orthodoxies and conventions, and
unlimited by boundaries of schools or disciplines.
The disadvantages of homelessness should be obvious. Firstly, the rejection of
boundaries  between  schools  and  academic  disciplines  brings  the  whole  of
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human knowledge into the anarchist’s scope, but that is impossible to cover.
Specialization cuts up knowledge and research into manageable chunks, and
rejecting  the  boundaries  between  those  “chunks”  means  giving  up
manageability. One could, of course, accept the chaos and hope for serendipity,
but “serendipity” is just another word for “luck”, and relying on luck hardly
satisfies requirements of transparency. To some extent, manageability can be
regained by acquiring a basic knowledge of as many fields as possible, in that
way producing a “map” of the full terrain of human knowledge, which can be
used  for  subsequent  navigation.  Obviously,  this  would require considerable
effort,  and  even  then,  the  map  would  always  remain  flawed  and  send  its
owner/creator  astray  occasionally.  Secondly,  because  a  metaphilosophical
anarchist is not affiliated to any school and not a specialist in any branch, she
is  not  likely to  make a  significant  contribution to  any established research
program,  effectively denying  her  the  chance  of  academic  prestige  and  any
related academic reward (at  least  in current  academic philosophy).  Thirdly,
because a metaphilosophical anarchist is not affiliated to any school, she is an
“enemy” of all of them, and not likely to be very welcome. This may force the
anarchist  to the fringes of academic life; that is,  to the precarious status of
para-academic (Waldrop & Withers 2014).15
These  are  significant  disadvantages,  especially  in  conjunction:  the  first
requires extraordinary effort, the second and third deny academic reward for
that  effort.  From  the  perspective  of  the  individual  philosopher,  therefore,
metaphilosophical anarchism is a  very bad career choice; so bad in fact, that
no-one  should  (aspire  to)  become  an  anarchist.16 From  the  perspective  of
philosophy as a discipline, on the other hand, things look a little bit differently:
15 Perhaps this is reality already. Of the authors of the stack of more engaged and less rigidly
scholastic  papers  on  one  of  my  shelves,  more  than  half  have  adjunct  positions  teaching
subjects like creative writing. Probably this isn’t a representative sample, however, so I won’t
draw any conclusions from it.
16 This assumes, of course, that it is a choice rather than a disposition.
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philosophy  might  need  its  anarchists.17 If  indeed  only  metaphilosophical
anarchists are free to move from school to school and from branch to branch
(and  even  from  discipline  to  discipline), then  only  they  can  be  the
intermediaries  and  translators  needed  to  facilitate  the  communication
necessary  to  forge  philosophy  into  a  cultural  genre.  And  if  only
metaphilosophical anarchists are free to research the big questions that matter
to people outside the academy, then only they are able to make that cultural
genre relevant; that is, to make it a “voice in the conversation of mankind” that
actually matters. However, the third disadvantage precludes this: as an outsider
(or para-academic) an anarchist cannot play any significant part in facilitating
communication  on  the  inside  (i.e. between  schools).  Furthermore,  even  if
philosophy needs its anarchists, philosophical institutes don’t. Institutes tend to
be (relatively) safeguarded by the inertia of the larger institutional settings they
are  part  of,  and  even  if  they  are  not,  the  second  disadvantage  of
metaphilosophical anarchism makes it  very unlikely that an anarchist would
make them any safer. Moreover, the problematic implications of specialization
signalized in the first pages of this essay are much less visible within institutes
where personal communication masks the lack of substantial communication
between specialists.
So does this mean that metaphilosophical anarchism is a bad idea? The answer
to that question depends on one’s expectations. Anarchism is not a panacea. It
could contribute  to  the  re-integration  of  philosophy  (both  internally  and
externally),  but  only if  certain preconditions would be met — acceptance of
metaphilosophical anarchism as a genuine option being the most basic — and
inertia makes this unlikely. Anarchism may very well be the solution to the
other  problem  mentioned  above — that  of  the  individual  philosopher  with
17 Conversely,  a  metaphilosophical  anarchist  needs the sects  and specializations of  academic
philosophy (and other sciences) for their perspectival variety, and   especially  as sources of
theories,  arguments,  and ideas.  “Esoteric  discussions”  by specialists  matter,  albeit  usually
(very)  indirectly.  Theories  of  truth,  metaphysics,  epistemology,  and  so  forth,  have  wider
implications. See footnote 14 for a sketchy illustration. 
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unfashionably broad and ordinary concerns — but the costs may be higher than
most are willing to pay. Perhaps, this leads to the conclusion that anarchism is
a bad idea indeed. I have one final argument for metaphilosophical anarchism,
however.  Recall  that  anarchism always  prioritizes  transparency  and  reason
above convention, dogma and the authority of school and orthodoxy. But isn’t
that  what  all philosophy is  supposed  to  do?  If  so,  then  metaphilosophical
anarchism is an empty “-ism”: it is what philosophy is supposed to be.18
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